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Abstract: During the campaign leading to the 2014 Scottish referendum on 
independence, social policy issues played a central role. This article explains the nature 
of Scottish nationalist mobilization and its relationship with social policy, from the drive 
for “home rule” in the 1980s and early-mid 1990s to the 2014 referendum campaign. As 
shown, the idea that Scotland must become independent from the United Kingdom to 
protect its more progressive nation from social policy retrenchment originating from the 
central (British) government appeared long before the 2014 referendum campaign. In 
fact, the march towards devolution in the 1980s and early to mid-1990s had featured a 
similar argument about how political autonomy could enable Scots to make social policy 
better suited to their social democratic preferences. Through a comparison with the 1980 
and 1995 Québec referendums on sovereignty, this article offers a comparative and 
historical perspective on the social policy debate surrounding the 2014 Scottish 
referendum while focusing primarily on health care and old-age pensions. 
Keywords: Nationalism; referendum; independence; social policy; Scotland; Québec 
Résumé:  
Au cours de la campagne référendaire de 2014 au sujet de l’indépendance écossaise, les 
questions de protection sociale jouèrent un rôle central. Cet article explore la nature de la 
mobilisation nationaliste écossaise et sa relation avec la protection sociale, du 
mouvement des années 1980 et de la première moitié des années 1990 en faveur de 
l’“autonomie interne” (home rule) jusqu’à la campagne référendaire de 2014. Tel que 
souligné, l'idée que l'Écosse devrait devenir indépendante du Royaume-Uni pour protéger 
sa nation plus progressiste contre les politiques d’austérité du gouvernement central 
(britannique) émergea bien avant la campagne référendaire de 2014. En fait, la marche 
vers la décentralisation des années 1980 et de la première moitié des années 1990 
s’accompagna d’un argument similaire concernant la manière dont l’autonomie politique 
pourrait permettre aux Écossais de développer des politiques sociales mieux adaptées à 
leurs préférences sociales démocratiques. À travers une comparaison avec les 
référendums québécois sur la souveraineté de 1980 et 1995, cet article propose une 
perspective historique et comparative sur le débat au sujet de la protection sociale qui 
entoura le référendum écossais de 2014 tout en mettant principalement l’accent sur les 
soins de santé et les pensions de vieillesse. 
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“It’s now well understood that voting yes will allow us to protect Scotland's National 
Health Service (NHS) from the threat to budgets here as a consequence of the cult of 
austerity and privatisation being forced on the NHS in England.” (quoted in Carrell, 
2014) These words were spoken by Scottish First Minister and Scottish National Party 
(SNP) leader, Alex Salmond, about a month before the 2014 referendum on Scotland’s 
independence. They constituted a central argument in the Yes campaign for Scottish 
independence, especially in the last stretch of the campaign when secessionist leaders 
were desperately trying to push their option over the 50 per cent + 1 of the vote they 
needed.  
 The idea that Scotland had to become independent from the United Kingdom to 
protect its more progressive nation from neoliberalism and social policy retrenchment 
originating in the central British government did not make its first appearance in the 2014 
referendum campaign. In fact, the march towards devolution in the 1980s and early to 
mid-1990s had featured a similar argument about how political autonomy could enable 
Scots to make public policy, and especially social policy, better suited to their social 
democratic preferences. Therefore, a pattern seems to exist in contemporary Scottish 
nationalist mobilization whereby references to social policy are made to persuade Scots 
to support increased political autonomy from the British state. In the absence of 
significant linguistic or religious differences, Scottish nationalist leaders have used the 
apparent connection between their community and progressive values on health care and 
social policy more generally to mobilize the population in favour of greater autonomy 
and, during the 2014 referendum campaign, independence. 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 10 No. 1 2016 July-December: 1-30 
3 
 
 This emphasis on social policy in nationalist mobilization is not unique to 
Scotland and the case of Québec offers an instructive comparative perspective. The Parti 
québécois (PQ) has long promoted progressive social policy as part of the province’s 
identity and argued that independence would allow the province to further work on social 
justice. In the broad context of a national identity defined in part by progressive positions 
on redistribution and social protection, specific policies and programs such as drug 
insurance, affordable daycare, and university tuition fees lower than most everywhere in 
the country have become, in the last couple of decades, symbols of Québec’s national 
distinctiveness. Contrary to the situation prevailing in Scotland in the 2014, however, 
social policy issues played a relatively limited role in both the 1980 and 1995 Québec 
sovereignty referendums (Béland and Lecours, 2008). In 1980, Québec nationalism was 
driven by the liberation and emancipation of a French-speaking people and, indeed, by 
the notion of creating a social-democratic country, but without the type of specific 
references that would develop beginning in the late 1990s, when “l’État social” became 
synonymous with “l’État national.” In 1995, mobilization for a “yes” vote during the 
referendum campaign centred on the failure of the Meech and Charlottetown Accords, 
interpreted by sovereignist leaders as a rejection of Québec by the rest of the country.  
In this context, one cannot assume that social policy, even when it becomes part 
of a nation-building project at the sub-state level as is the case in Québec, will become a 
central component of a referendum campaign, as was the case in 2014 Scotland. The 
objective of this article is to explain why social policy became so central to both nation-
building and referendum politics in Scotland, in contrast with the Québec experience 
where the link between nation-building and social policy did not shape the referendums 
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nearly as much as in Scotland. As argued, with the backdrop of a coalition government 
led by a Conservative Party extremely unpopular in Scotland, issues of redistribution and 
social justice became central aspects of the political discourse of both the “Yes Scotland” 
and the “Better Together” campaigns.  
The article is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the interaction 
between nationalism and social policy and explains why it can serve as an important 
point of reference in nationalist mobilization processes. The second section looks at the 
two main instances of contemporary nationalist mobilization in Scotland, the drive for 
“home rule” and the 2014 campaign leading up to the 18 September referendum on 
independence. The last section features a comparative discussion of Québécois 
nationalism and the experience of sovereignty referendums in the province, which 
contrasts with that of Scotland.  
We focus on two major social policy issues in our analysis of the 2014 
referendum campaign to shed light on the connection between nationalism and social 
policy in Scotland: health care and public pensions. The rationale for this selection is 
twofold. First, these two policy areas affect either the population as a whole (health care) 
or a major demographic group (public pensions). This makes them prominent social 
policy fields for voters and politicians alike. Second, there are important differences in 
the institutional governance of these policies: health care is a devolved matter while 
public pensions represent a reserved matter.1 As we shall see, the differentiated nature of 
social policy-making in Scotland under devolution did not prevent the mobilization of the 
nationalism-social policy nexus. The following analysis begins with health care, with a 
focus on the NHS, a devolved area of social policy (Greer, 2004). The NHS was 
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particularly central to the referendum campaign in part because it was used by “Yes 
Scotland” to make broader arguments about the type of social policies Scots were said to 
want and that independence could make possible. Then, we move to public pensions, 
which were less of a symbolic issue than the future of the NHS in the campaign, but were 
nevertheless discussed as a key social policy whose future, according to both sides, 
would be drastically different in an independent Scotland. Overall, our goal is to analyze 
the discourse of both “Yes Scotland” and “Better Together” around these policies rather 
than to assess how social policy arguments impacted public opinion and voting 
behaviour.  
 
Nationalist Mobilization and Social Policy 
Nationalism and the state are inextricably linked (Breuilly, 1994). The origins of the 
state, at least from the modernist perspective,2 lie in processes of state-building that 
involved centralization, bureaucratization (Gellner, 1982), and the development of public 
policies aimed at a territorially-circumscribed population. The development of such 
public policies was central to nation-building. Compulsory public education, for example, 
worked towards linguistic and cultural homogenization, as well as the diffusion of 
symbols and narratives that were framed as national (Weber, 1976). 
In the post-War War II era, the development and expansion of the modern welfare 
state further contributed to the strengthening of the (statewide) nation. For instance, in 
countries with universal social programs such as the UK and Canada, the pooling of 
fiscal resources and economic risks at a (state) national level encouraged solidarity within 
the boundaries of the state, as well as loyalty towards that state. The national community 
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also became a community of protection and redistribution where social policies such as 
public health care coverage, old-age pensions, employment insurance, and social 
assistance represented tangible benefits of inclusion in the nation (McEwen, 2006). Many 
of these social programs came to be central symbols of nationhood in their respective 
countries (Fierlbeck, 2011). Social policy has therefore played an important role in the 
development and consolidation of (state) national identities in advanced industrialized 
countries, particularly in multinational democracies (Gagnon and Tully, 2001). This is the 
case in the Canada, where federal social policies have been used as tools of nation-
building by the central government (Banting, 2005). In the United Kingdom, the post-war 
era also saw the development of a welfare state that built up allegiance to the British 
political community (McEwen, 2006). 
The development of the modern welfare state offered potential for social policy to 
become constitutive of the nation. To some extent, the dominant values of a political 
community shaped, or at least became embodied in, specific social programs. Social 
policy was therefore more than a simple instrument in the hands of nation-builders who 
could use it to attract the political loyalty of citizens from minority communities. Its 
development for the purpose of protecting citizens against social risks also had the 
unintended consequence of serving a nation-building process by adding redistribution and 
social solidarity to the bonds uniting a territorial community.  
 If the connection between nationalism and social policy in the context of a (state) 
national community is increasingly recognized, less has been said about how nationalist 
movements can use social policy to stimulate territorial mobilization against the central 
state (Béland and Lecours, 2008). In the case of Scotland, the emphasis on social policy 
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is related at least in part to the fact that two factors which have stimulated and legitimized 
sub-state nationalist mobilization and the quest for greater autonomy or independence in 
a number of countries are generally absent: “hard” cultural differences (language and 
religion) and oppression grievances towards the state.  
 First, in terms of linguistic and religious differences, some authors believe that 
they present an inherent potential for nationhood (Connor, 1990) and that communities 
with these distinct traits will normally look to acquire or increase their political 
autonomy. Some scholars have emphasized the role of political elites in providing 
subjective meaning to cultural markers and in rallying the members of their communities 
around a collective distinctiveness (Brass, 1991). In other words, politicians struggling 
for power can find it attractive and effective to use the distinct language or religion of 
their political community as a focus for mobilization. This dynamic is virtually absent in 
Scotland. Cultural differences between Scotland and England are not sufficiently “hard” 
(that is, they are not related to language or religion) to be used for nationalist 
mobilization in the way typically described in the literature.3 
 Second, for other authors, nationalist mobilization is the result of grievances 
against a state that has looked to assimilate or marginalize a distinct community (Fearon 
and Laitin, 2003). Even in the absence of violence and repression, minority communities 
can find themselves in states with constitutional regimes that systematically favour the 
majority community. This is not the case in the United Kingdom. There are no serious 
Scottish accusations that the British state has purposefully worked towards the 
marginalization of Scotland and the assimilation of Scots. In fact, the United Kingdom is 
typically described as a “union-state” (Rokkan and Urwin, 1982; Keating, 2004) or a 
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“state of unions” (Mitchell, 2010); that is, it is described as a state that has fully 
acknowledged its multinational nature and resisted adopting a Jacobin model of 
“integration.” In this context of the British Empire, the United Kingdom also offered 
Scottish business important trade and market opportunities.4 There have been, in the last 
few decades, claims that Scotland is the victim of a British “democratic deficit” because 
several British (Conservative) governments have been formed with virtually no support 
from Scottish Members of Parliament. While these claims have in fact spurred 
contemporary nationalist mobilization in Scotland, such mobilization has not been 
propelled by references to deep historical grievances of oppression and assimilation 
against the United Kingdom.  
 Despite the absence of these historical grievances and of “hard” cultural 
differences with England, Scottish society has been effectively mobilized in the name of 
the nation twice in the last 30 years: in the drive for “home rule” and during the 2014 
independence referendum campaign. On both occasions, social policy emerged as a 
crucial component of nationalist mobilization. As suggested, in Scotland, this is true not 
only because politicians use social policy to mobilize voters but because social programs 
have long helped frame the Scottish nation and the nationalist claims surrounding it.  
 
The Drive for “Home Rule” and Social Policy  
The push for “home rule” during the 1980s and early to mid-1990s should be understood 
in a context of growing dissatisfaction towards Conservative governments in 
Westminster. In the 1979 and 1983 general elections, out of 72 seats, the Conservative 
Party won 22 and 21 seats respectively in Scotland. These numbers were basically halved 
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in the two subsequent elections (the Conservatives won 10 seats in Scotland in 1987 and 
11 in 1992), after a decade or so of welfare retrenchment discourse and policies that were 
unpopular in Scotland. The weakness of the Conservative Party in Scotland beginning in 
the late 1980s rendered the British government’s policies even less tolerable for most 
Scots.  
Scottish perceptions of Thatcherism and the retrenchment and privatization 
policies associated with it, including in the field of health and social policy reform, fed 
nationalism in Scotland (McCrone, 2001). As Scottish intellectual Gerry Hassan stated: 
“By the late 1980s, Scottishness had become to me a kind of political resistance against 
Thatcherism. This was imbued with a moral superiority in relation to the English. They 
embraced Thatcherism; we rejected it. We opposed tax cuts, privatisation, council house 
sales; they embraced it” (quoted in Devine and Logue, 2002: 95). Scottish Labour 
officials supported this perspective, arguing that constitutional change was necessary to 
make sure “another Mrs Thatcher can never represent the same threat” to Scotland 
(Brown and Alexander, 1990: 10). In other words, Labour successfully depicted itself as 
the promoter of Scottish autonomy against conservative social and economic policies 
(Hutchinson, 2001: 148). The SNP, meanwhile, developed a fairly similar social-
democratic ethos and, with a very similar logic, argued that the independence of Scotland 
was necessary to avoid more England-based Conservative governments that would 
unavoidably impose their neoliberal policies on Scottish society. In this context, social 
policy gradually became an integral part of Scottish identity and nationalism (Béland and 
Lecours, 2008).  
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Thus, under both Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) and John Major (1990-1997), 
the idea that political autonomy would help Scotland protect progressive social programs 
against Conservative attacks emanating from Westminster became a central aspect of the 
territorial mobilization for “home rule,” leading to the successful 1997 referendum on 
devolution initiated at the beginning of the Blair years (1997-2007). During and after the 
Thatcher era, this political mobilization took place in the context of a redefinition of the 
Scottish nation in part around the pursuit of distinct social policy objectives. Civil society 
actors like the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) played a direct role in this 
reframing of Scottish nationalism around the idea of progressive social programming, in 
opposition to the policies then adopted at Westminster (Béland and Lecours, 2008).  
At a broader level, as Gerry Mooney and Charlotte Williams (2006) noted, in 
Scotland, social policy issues became a central aspect of the quest for devolution. This 
was clear during the 1997 Scottish referendum campaign on devolution where these 
issues played a direct and explicit role. For instance, a group of physicians argued that 
devolution would allow Scotland to tackle public health issues more effectively than 
under the existing, more centralized system of government (Béland and Lecours, 2008). 
After Scots voted for devolution in 1997, the idea that political autonomy was important 
for Scotland, in part because of the need to implement distinct, more progressive social 
policy preferences remained a significant feature of Scottish nationalism, a fact that 
should not hide the limitations of the social policies enacted by the new Scottish 
parliament after devolution (Mooney and Poole, 2004). Despite these limitations, and the 
fact that devolution only led to limited social policy decentralization (for instance, social 
security remained a Westminster competency and Scotland received only limited fiscal 
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autonomy), the link between progressive social policy and Scottish nationalism—as a 
discourse and as a form of political mobilization—remained. The following analysis of 
the debate over social policy issues during the 2014 independence referendum in 
Scotland backs this claim.  
 
The 2014 Independence Referendum Campaign 
A peculiarity of the Scottish referendum is that it did not have a precipitating event. After 
the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, the SNP promised to organize a 
referendum on independence whenever it could get support from a majority of MSPs 
(Members of the Scottish Parliament).5 In the 2007 elections, the SNP won 47 seats, just 
edging out the Scottish Labour party, which won 46 seats, and thereafter formed a 
minority government. During this minority government period, the SNP launched a 
“National Conversation” (held between August 2007 and November 2009), whereby 
Scots were invited to weigh in on the constitutional future of Scotland in such forums as 
public meetings and internet blogs. For the SNP, this was a way to seriously engage Scots 
with the issue of constitutional change and with its own preferred option of 
independence. The best case scenario, for the nationalist party, was that it soon would be 
in a position to organize a referendum on Scotland’s constitutional future. The SNP 
received that opportunity when it won a majority of seats in the 2011 Scottish elections, 
thanks in large part to the increasing unpopularity of Labour. The election of a majority 
SNP government that year was not the product of a surge in favour of Scotland’s 
independence. Rather, it was both the reward for what Scots considered to be four years 
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of competent government and the product of on-going, and growing, dissatisfaction 
towards Labour.  
The majority SNP government made the promotion of independence and the 
organization of a referendum that would allow Scots to speak on the issue its highest 
priority from the beginning of its mandate. In October 2012, the Scottish and British 
governments signed the Edinburgh agreement specifying the parameters for the 
referendum. The British government obtained what it wanted most: a referendum where 
Scots would have to say “yes” or “no” on one short straightforward question on 
independence.6 There was, in all likelihood, very little doubt in the mind of Prime 
Minister Cameron that the Scots would choose to stay within the United Kingdom in the 
context of such a choice. Through this agreement, the Scottish government removed any 
potential doubt on the constitutionality, legality, and legitimacy of the referendum as both 
parties committed to honour its result. It also was able to decide on the timing of the 
referendum (wanted in the last year of its mandate) and on the franchise (residents of 
Scotland aged 16 and 17 would be granted the right to vote in the referendum).  
For the SNP, a lot of convincing and mobilizing needed to be done to reach its 
ultimate political objective After all, support for independence in Scotland had rarely 
been over 40 per cent, and the SNP needed more than half of the votes on 18 September 
2014 to say “yes” to the following question: “Should Scotland be an independent 
country?” 
The SNP led the “Yes Scotland” side but the Scottish Green Party, the Scottish 
Socialist Party as well as grassroots organizations linked to the Radical Independence 
Campaign (RIC) also played an important role in mobilizing Scottish civil society. A key 
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moment in the campaign was the publication in November 2013 of a “white paper” on 
independence (Scottish Government, 2013a). The mere publication of this paper—in 
Alex Salmond’s words, “the most comprehensive blueprint for an independent 
country ever published” (Black, 2013)—was intended by the SNP to indicate the 
seriousness of the independence project. As one commentator put it, “The White Paper—
all 650 pages of it—wasn’t meant to be read; it was supposed to be a thudding statement 
declaring We’ve thought about this and it’s going to be OK” (Massie, 2014; italics in the 
original).  
Still, the White Paper laid the basis for the arguments that would be developed to 
promote independence. The document states that: “Democracy, prosperity and fairness 
are the principles at the heart of the case for independence.” (The Smith Commission, 40) 
In fact, these three themes were at the centre of the Yes campaign’s discourse about the 
merits of Scotland becoming independent.  
Democracy, “Yes Scotland” leaders argued, involved the right for a community to 
be governed by politicians it chose. From this perspective, Scotland was often in a 
democratic deficit within the UK because, even after devolution, some policies 
formulated by the British government applied to Scotland despite very few Conservative 
MPs (only one since 2005) having been elected by the Scottish people. The focus on 
democracy was embodied by the oft-repeated line: “With independence, Scotland will 
always get the governments we vote for” (Ibid, 42).  
“Yes Scotland” leaders also sought to counter questions raised by the “Better 
Together” campaign about the fiscal, financial, and economic consequences of 
independence by assuring Scots that Scotland had enough resources to be a prosperous 
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independent country. “Even without North Sea oil,” the White Paper states, “Scotland’s 
economy produces almost exactly the same amount of output per head as the rest of the 
UK. With oil and gas, we produce nearly a fifth more” (Ibid, 43). Still, oil was a key 
element of the “Yes Scotland” campaign’s prosperity argument, as its spokespeople 
accused the British government of downplaying the depth of North Sea reserves. 
For the SNP government, inequalities in Scotland are the direct product of 
Westminster policies, and independence would give the Scottish government the 
necessary powers to craft a fairer, more progressive, and more egalitarian society. 
“Within the UK,” the White Paper argues, “Scotland is part of an increasingly unequal 
society” (Ibid, 40). From this perspective, there exists an ideological (social-democratic) 
consensus in Scotland that would underpin, and be reflected by, public policy. 
 When combined, the three “principles” at the heart of the case for independence 
according to the SNP take us right into the nationalism-social policy nexus. The SNP’s 
discourse suggests that one of the constitutive aspects of the Scottish nation is its 
egalitarian nature. Above and beyond some of the differences between the SNP, the 
Scottish Greens, the RIC, and groupings such as Common Weal on the specific social 
policies most desirable in Scotland, the idea that Scots prioritize equality, and therefore 
broadly support significant wealth redistribution, was foremost in the characterization of 
Scotland put forth by “Yes Scotland.”7 In fact, from the nationalist perspective, there is a 
Scottish collective and egalitarian ethos that stands in sharp contrast to English values 
emphasizing individual autonomy and the market. Although survey data suggest such a 
sharp dichotomy is an exaggeration, this is a strong and enduring idea in Scottish politics 
(Béland and Lecours, 2008).8  
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The strength of this idea allowed “Yes Scotland” to make an argument about 
independence that linked Scottish preferences on social policy and the workings of the 
United Kingdom’s Westminster government. “Yes Scotland” leaders argued that, as a 
result of a political system where British governments can be formed without the support 
of a substantial numbers of Scottish MPs, the direction social policy had taken over the 
last few decades was incongruent with Scottish values and social policy preferences. By 
assuming all the policymaking powers of a sovereign state, the nationalist argument was 
that independence could, through the enactment of more progressive social policies, 
reduce inequalities in Scotland, produce a fairer society, and thus respect the genuine 
preferences of Scots. The “Yes Scotland” campaign took the shape of a social justice 
movement (Mooney and Scott, 2014). Full possession of its North Sea oil, the argument 
went, would allow Scotland to finance the type of social programs its people prefer. The 
same discourse used by several different parties and political forces to mobilize Scots in 
support of home rule more than two decades before served the “Yes Scotland” campaign 
well in its own effort to generate support for independence. 
 At a more specific level, the NHS was one of the “Yes Scotland” campaign’s 
favourite subjects in the debates leading up to the 2014 referendum. Many times, Scottish 
First Minister Alex Salmond raised the spectre of Westminster’s increased privatisation 
of the NHS as a prime motivation for Scots to vote in favour of independence. Surveys 
showed that a large majority of Scots opposed private companies running NHS 
hospitals.9 The NHS’ founding principle, Salmond argued, had been “scorned and 
betrayed by successive Westminster governments” (Carrell, 2014). An independent 
Scotland, the “Yes Scotland” campaign argued, was therefore necessary to preserve a 
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universal and publicly-funded health care system. A foremost British institution and 
symbol of territorial, national, and social solidarity in the United Kingdom, the NHS was 
used as a lightning rod for nationalist mobilization. Alex Salmond even mused about 
writing the NHS into the constitution of an independent Scotland. Making reference to 
NHS founder, Aneurin (Nye) Bevan, Salmond said: “With independence we have the 
golden opportunity to enshrine (Nye) Bevan’s founding principles for our National 
Health Service in the written constitution for Scotland-publicly-owned, clinically-driven, 
and freely-delivered for all- a guarantee that not only will the NHS be kept in public 
hands, but that the services are free to access today and will be free to access in the 
future” (quoted in MacNab, 2014).  
Health care is a devolved matter, and Salmond’s suggestion that independence 
was necessary to “protect” it led “Better Together” politicians to point out that Scotland’s 
NHS was already under the total control of the Scottish government. But the “Yes 
Scotland” campaign still maintained there was a threat because privatisation in England 
could lead to a decrease in NHS funding for Scotland. “Better Together” countered by 
saying this was the “biggest lie of the referendum campaign” (Carrell, 2014). But the 
credibility of the British political parties of “Better Together” on this issue was not great 
in Scotland.10 For many people in Scotland the British Labour governments of the late 
1990s and 2000s initiated the privatisation of public services (as one audience member 
reminded “Better Together” leader Alistair Darling in the second referendum debate). 
The Tory brand, of course, seemed beyond repair in Scotland while the Liberal-
Democrats suffered from the party’s participation in the Conservative-led coalition 
government at Westminster. 
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Labour attempted to fight the “Yes Scotland” campaign’s nationalist mobilization 
over the NHS by emphasizing the progressive character of Britishness, especially among 
its traditional working-class constituency. Labour also attempted to challenge “Yes 
Scotland’s” discourse about a progressive Scotland needing to emancipate from a 
conservative England. In Glasgow, Labour leader Ed Miliband said:  
 
So Alex Salmond wants to tell you a very particular story. In this story, 
England is conservative, while Scotland is a progressive beacon. Of 
course, the Scottish people have always stood out for their strongest ideals 
of social justice. Shown by the history of educational opportunity for all. 
Shown by the campaign down the years for the right to work. And the 
opposition to the poll tax. But my case is that these ideals for Scotland can 
best be realised in the United Kingdom. (…) I stand here today as a 
challenger against a Government in Westminster which is wrong on the 
economy, and has no vision for the United Kingdom. And as a challenger 
against a Government in Holyrood with a plan for separation which will 
not help the working people of Scotland. A challenger, determined to fight 
to make this whole country fairer. Because I am proud of what our nations 
have achieved together. And because I know that our best, our fairest, our 
most just days lie ahead of us, together.11 
 
“Alex Salmond’s story,” however, was very powerful because it tapped into the 
nationalism-social policy nexus that developed during the Thatcher and Major years, and 
helped deliver devolution. For Scots, the association between their nation and a 
progressive, social-democratic model meant that the prospect of more Conservative 
governments in Westminster represented a threat not only to what most considered 
appropriate social policy but also to their nationhood. In this context, the fear of what 
Conservatives in Westminster could do to social policy was used to counter anxieties 
stemming from the potential economic, financial, and fiscal consequences of 
independence. 
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Yet the idea of independence had the potential to generate social policy anxieties 
of its own, especially in policy areas such as public pensions, which remained entirely 
managed and financed by the central state, as did other elements of the social security 
system. In fact, devolution did not lead to the decentralization of social security in the 
aftermath of the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999. In this context, the 
very fact that older people received pensions from the central state could in itself have 
become an argument against independence, something that happened in Canada during 
the campaign leading to the 1980 Québec referendum when opponents of “separation” 
suggested federal pensions would be threatened in the case of a “yes” vote (Béland and 
Lecours, 2008).  
Anticipating this type of argument from the “Better Together” campaign, as early 
as September 2013 the Scottish Government released a 109-page long report titled 
Pensions in an Independent Scotland. As expected considering the above remarks, one of 
the first points made in the report was the fact that the State Pension currently paid by the 
central government would not be eliminated as a consequence of independence. 
Moreover, the report stressed that, while older people would continue to receive the 
equivalent of the existing State Pension in an independent Scotland, significant 
improvements to the public pension system would be made to strengthen their overall 
economic security:  
 
With independence, we will keep the best of the existing State Pensions 
system, making genuine improvements where necessary. This means that 
the State Pension will continue as now, and planned reforms will be rolled 
out, including the single-tier pension. All pensions will continue to be paid 
as now and all accrued rights will be honoured and protected. 
Improvements include a commitment to apply the Triple Lock to the 
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single-tier pension, the Basic State Pension and Guarantee Credit initially 
for the term of the first independent parliament, thereby protecting the 
value of pensions over time. We will maintain Savings Credit to benefit 
low-income households (Scottish Government, 2013b: ii).  
 
From this perspective, the issue here was not simply about preserving the status quo, as in 
the case of the NHS, but about improving the quality of public pension coverage 
available to older residents of Scotland. Pledging more generous public pensions seemed 
like a straightforward proposition considering the well-documented flaws of the current 
British public pension system: “In 2011, the UK ranked 2nd worst out of 27 EU member 
states for both men and women in terms of how well the state pays pensioners relative to 
gross average pre-retirement earnings.” (Scottish Government, 2013b: 2) Interestingly, 
however, perhaps in the name of fiscal prudence, the improvements to public pensions 
discussed in the 2013 pension report appeared incremental in nature, as the State Pension 
would only undertake limited changes after independence. This being said, “Yes 
Scotland” argued that public, state-granted pensions could be significantly improved in 
an independent Scotland12, and it made at least two promises to that effect. First, it said 
that pension age could be lower in an independent Scotland as the UK was preparing to 
increase its age to 67 (Yes Edinburgh North and Leith, 2014). Second, it stated that 
public pensions would “rise every year in line with prices, earnings or by 2.5 per cent, 
whichever is the highest” (Yes Scotland, 2014).  
The “Better Together” campaign came down hard on the pension proposals of the 
Scottish government during the referendum campaign. For instance, in July 2014, the 
chairman of the Labour Co-operative, MP Ian Davidson, stated that: 
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The only thing definite about the Scottish Government’s welfare policies 
is uncertainty. They cannot say what their pensions bill would be. They 
have no credible plans to cope with the rising costs of Scotland’s ageing 
population. They don’t know what their own promises would cost. 
Pensioners—current and future—deserve certainty. Instead the Scottish 
Government offer [sic] no detail, no costings, no believable plan and what 
they are offering amounts to the biggest mis-selling scandal in history. 
Without any Scottish Government plan, no Scot is able to plan for their 
pension after separation. They are asking the people of Scotland to leave 
the strength of the pooling and sharing of resources in the UK for a future 
they cannot even begin to detail after separation (quoted in The Scotsman, 
2014). 
 
Pension and retirement decisions involve long-term planning on the part of individuals 
and families so uncertainty about their future is, politically, a particularly sensitive issue. 
In this context, it is not surprising that the “Better Together” campaign emphasized the 
potential pension uncertainty stemming from independence, an issue rendered especially 
crucial as a result of the demographic and electoral weight of older people, in Scotland as 
elsewhere. In this context, the “Yes Scotland” camp did its best to dispel uncertainties 
about the future of public pensions in a post-independence Scotland, but only with 
limited success.13 In fact, in a poll published the day before the vote asking voters if they 
felt old age pensions would be higher or lower in an independent Scotland, 28 per cent 
said they would be lower while 19 per cent thought they would be higher (30 per cent felt 
they would be unchanged and 22 per cent did not know) (Scotsman ICM Poll, 2014).  
The discourse of “Yes Scotland” during the referendum campaign was much 
more centred on health care than on any other social policy. Yet, the debate over the State 
Pension points to the diversity of the social policy issues raised in the months preceding 
the 18 September vote. For example, Scotland’s Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon 
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“warned that £310m could be cut from disability welfare spending in Scotland” if the 
“no” side won (Carrell, 2014). 
To stop the momentum of “Yes Scotland,” the leaders of the three British parties 
sought to formally counter its discourse on nationalism and social policy by addressing 
both general notions of social justice and the NHS more specifically. In their “vow,” 
Prime Minister David Cameron, Labour leader Ed Miliband, and leader of the Liberal 
Democrats, Nick Clegg, first promised that “extensive new powers for Scotland” would 
follow a rejection of independence. Next, they spoke to social justice, stating that “the 
UK exists to ensure opportunity and security for all by sharing our resources equitably.” 
Finally, the three leaders sought to reassure Scottish voters about the future of the NHS as 
they promised that “the final say on funding for the NHS would lie with the Scottish 
government” (Daily Record, 2014).  
Fittingly, these promises were first outlined by the dominant figure of Scottish 
Labour politics, former British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. For Brown, a defining 
feature of the Union is “the pooling and sharing of resources through UK-wide pensions, 
UK-wide provision for social security and UK-wide National Insurance” (Brown, 2014: 
239).14 Britishness, from this perspective, is defined in a very similar way as 
Scottishness. Overall, “the future of welfare entitlements and the welfare state more 
generally was deployed by both sides in the debate with YES advocating that the future 
of the welfare state was only secure with independence and the NO campaign claiming 
that independence would lead to an end to cross-UK transfers and therefore a decline in 
services” (Mooney and Scott, 2014). 
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Discussion: Scotland and Québec 
In the end, Scots rejected independence by a 10 per cent margin (55 per cent to 45 per 
cent), despite a late surge of the “yes” option in the polls that coincided with an 
intensification of the discussion about the future of the NHS in Scotland. Just like during 
the campaign for “home rule” that began during the Thatcher years, Scottish secessionists 
featured the advancement of progressive values and social policies prominently in their 
nationalist mobilization discourse. This continuity in patterns of nationalist mobilization 
in Scotland highlights the enduring relationship between nationalism and social policy in 
Scottish politics, a relationship that is likely to strengthen as the most recent Scotland Bill 
enhances the powers of the Scottish Parliament over social policy.15 Moreover, with 
Nicola Sturgeon succeeding Alex Salmond at the head of the SNP, the political 
leadership of the nationalist movement in Scotland is moving towards even more social-
democratic policy positions.  
By contrast, in Québec, the expression of nationalism in terms of progressive 
social values and policies is less visible than it has been in some time. For example, the 
current Québec Liberal government’s austerity measures have not triggered the same type 
of criticism (i.e. that they undermine the very fabric of the nation) directed at Jean 
Charest’s ill-fated attempt at “re-engineering the state” a decade earlier. The Parti 
quebecois’s (PQ) leader from May 2015 to May 2016, communication magnate Pierre-
Karl Péladeau, also seemed to challenge the idea that nationalist politics in Québec 
requires the defence and promotion of a social-democratic welfare state. For instance, his 
strong anti-union positions during his long career in the private sector did not seem 
consistent with a social-democratic creed. Yet, Péladeau’s political aspirations within the 
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PQ necessitated an apparent change of heart as he has openly defended the province’s 
social programs and denounced the austerity measures of the current Liberal government 
(Rettino-Parazalli and Fortier, 2014). These measures, it is important to note, have left 
the core of Québec’s major social programs (publicly-funded day care, drug insurance, 
low university tuition fees) intact. In fact, the notion of progressive social policy remains 
constitutive of the nation in Québec, which limits the range of reform options available to 
policymakers.  
Importantly, however, the simple existence of a link between national identity and 
social policy does not necessarily mean that social programs are to play a central role in 
referendum politics. As suggested above, for instance, despite the existence of this link in 
Québec, neither the 1980 nor the 1995 referendums on sovereignty held in the province 
featured social policy prominently. The contrast in the referendum experiences in Québec 
and Scotland owes in part to the fact that Québec presents two important components of 
nationalist mobilization that are virtually absent in the Scottish case.  
The first component is the province’s linguistic distinctiveness, which allows 
secessionist leaders to link the question of Québec’s political future to the future of the 
French language. In other words, an argument for the independence of Québec can 
involve a reference to an issue—the vitality of French in the province—which is very 
important to many Quebeckers but is not directly related to the welfare state.  
The second component is an unresolved constitutional issue; Québec has not 
signed the 1982 Constitution Act, and the failure of subsequent attempts to reform the 
Canadian constitution in a way that would satisfy Québec represents an enduring sore 
point for Quebeckers. Fears surrounding the future of the French language in Québec and 
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anger about failed constitutional efforts may have abated in the last decade or so, but they 
remain potential sources for nationalist mobilization.  
Scotland, despite a strong national identity, lacks some of this “raw” material for 
nationalist mobilization, which explains the importance taken by social policy in the 
referendum campaign. The greater policy and fiscal autonomy enjoyed by Québec in the 
Canadian federation in comparison to Scotland’s situation in the United Kingdom also 
helps to explain why social policy was virtually absent during the 1980 and 1995 
referendum campaigns.  
In fact, whereas Scotland’s secessionist politicians could argue in 2014 that 
remaining part of the United Kingdom would make pensions and NHS Scotland 
vulnerable to unilateral cuts adopted in Westminster,16 the PQ is in a weaker position to 
make similar claims because the Québec government has near exclusive legislative 
control over health care and much of social welfare, in addition to opting out of the 
national pension program (Canada Pension Plan) and, instead, running its own earnings-
related pension program (the Québec Pension Plan). 
 
Conclusion 
Drawing on the Scottish experience in the mirror of the Québec experience, this article 
suggests that the existence of a direct relationship between nationalism and social policy 
at the sub-state level only translates into a central role for welfare in referendum politics 
under specific circumstances. In Scotland, culture and past grievances did not present 
sufficient nationalist mobilization potential for “Yes Scotland” to augment support for 
independence so much of the campaign was focused on social programming. Not only 
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was an emphasis on this theme picking up on the connection between the Scottish nation 
and progressive positions on welfare that had developed during the Thatcher years and 
played a key role in the devolution movement, but it also benefitted from the politics of 
austerity associated with the Cameron coalition government then in power at 
Westminster. The “Yes Scotland” campaign was therefore able to frame the idea of a 
major contrast between Scottish and English values, which was already central to 
modern, post-Thatcher national identity in Scotland.  
How potent this link between nationalism and social policy will be in the coming 
years, to what extent it can further shape British politics and who will benefit from it 
remain to be seen. The dramatic increase in SNP membership after the 2014 referendum 
and the triumph of the SNP at the 2015 Westminster election (and the complete collapse 
of Labour in Scotland) suggest that the referendum might have helped the SNP take full 
ownership of the nationalism and social policy nexus at the expense of both Labour and 
the Liberal-Democrats. More recently, the victory of the “Leave” side at the June 2016 
UK referendum on membership in the European Union could be good news for the SNP’s 
secessionist project. In fact, voters in Scotland voted massively to stay within the EU 
while a majority of English voters supported the “Leave” option, which led Scottish First 
Minister Nicola Sturgeon to state that a second referendum on independence was very 
much on the table. If another such referendum is held, the question of EU membership is 
likely to overshadow social policy in the argument in favour of independence. The Brexit 
vote provides the SNP with political ammunition not available to the PQ in Québec.  
 
  




                                                          
1 Throughout this article, the term “public pensions” refers exclusively to benefits such as 
the State Pension that target the general population, rather than occupational pensions for 
public workers, which are sometimes under the responsibility of the Scottish government, 
as is the case for teachers and NHS workers, for example.  
2 There is an alternative school to “modernism” (sometimes called “ethno-symbolism”) in 
the scholarship on nationalism that gives less importance to the state in the process of 
nation formation (Smith, 2009). 
3 There is a traditional Scottish accent consisting a strong rolling of the R’s, but it is 
uneven in the Scottish population and less audible in the younger generation (Fenton, 
2015).  
4 The end of the Empire may have been the first necessary structural condition for the 
decline of Unionism in Scotland.  
5 The question of independence was rarely asked before the establishment of the Scottish 
Parliament in 1999. Then, independence was for some years presented as two options 
(within or outside the EU) amongst five 
(http://whatscotlandthinks.org/search?query=&years=2004&topics=Attitudes+to+indepe
ndence ). 
6 The SNP considered many options in relation to the question, including presenting three 
options: independence, status quo and greater devolution. The British government 
insisted that there be no middle option.  
7 At the same time, Alex Salmond insisted that an independent Scotland would be fiscally 
responsible, as he argued his SNP government had been.  
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8 Perhaps for this reason, when Scots are asked who should make important decisions 
about welfare levels in Scotland, more than twice as many Scots choose the Scottish 




10 Scottish Labour and the Scottish Liberal-Democrats were still at that point seen as 
progressive forces, more in tune with Scottish values than their British counterparts.  
11 See Ed Miliband’s speech in Glasgow: 
http://www.totalpolitics.com/print/speeches/292477/ed-milibands-speech-on-scottish-
independence-in-glasgow.thtml . 
12 Survey data suggests the argument that old-age pensions would be higher after 
independence seemed to resonate only very mildly with Scots 
13 http://www.yesscotland.net/answers/what-about-pensions-independent-scotland and 
http://www.yesscotland.net/answers/what-would-independence-mean-my-state-pension-
and-credits .  
14 At the time of writing this article, there was not yet any available survey data on the 
impact of Brown’s intervention, or of the social policy argument, on the referendum vote. 
15 The Scotland Bill features the key provisions put forward by the Smith Commission 
(2014). It is often said by the British government that the Scotland Bill will make the 
Scottish Parliament the “most powerful devolved assembly in the world” (Green, 2015). 
16 The initial claim by “Yes Scotland” that Westminster could reform NHS Scotland 
towards greater privatization was dubious considering it is a devolved matter. When 
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“Better Together” pointed this out, “Yes Scotland” politicians replied that cuts in NHS 
funding would unavoidably lead to forced structural reforms for NHS Scotland. In fact, 
the Barnett formula works in such a way that spending decisions for England can affect 
funding for Scotland. If Westminster chose to implement important cuts in NHS funding 
for England, funding for the NHS in Scotland would also be reduced.  
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